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Abstract
Information technology capital now accounts for over 40% of all capital spending
while new fo-nMs of economic organization, both within and among firms, are
emerging. This essay models the "new managerial work", which features a reliance
on delegated decision-making and performance pay, as an optimal organizational
response to advances in information technology. The technology has automated
many routine tasks while accentuating the "information explosion" that increasingly
overwhelms top management. The model predicts an increase in decentralization
and performance pay in two steps. 1) The growth of inexpensive, but economically
valuable information both enables and necessitates the decentralization of
organizational information processing and decision-making, and 2) effective use of
distributed information processing requires that employees face more outcome-based
incentives and fewer rewards based on pre-specified behavior. The analysis also
indicates that there is a technological basis to the growth in the number of
"knowledge workers" and the decline in the use of rigid work rules.
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In the post-industrial society, the central problem is not how to
organize to produce efficiently (although this will always remain an
important consideration), but how to organize to make decisions --
that is, to process information.
-Simon (1976)
1. Introduction
1.1 The new organization of work
By all accounts, the past decade has witnessed dramatic changes in
management practice. Even as top management is being given access to a flood of
detailed information, the Taylorist model of rigid top-down control and carefully
itemized work rules is giving way to a new organization of work characterized by 1)
the decentralization of decision-making authority and 2) the increased use of pay-
for-performance.
The new pattern of decentralized decision-making has been compared in
scale and scope to the organizational changes associated with the earlier industrial
revolutions. Piore & Sabel (1984) write of a "second industrial divide" between
centralized mass production and knowledge-intensive "flexible specialization".
Drucker (1988) calls it the "third period of change: the shift from the command-and-
control organization...to the information-based organization, the organization of
knowledge specialists". Aoki (1990) adds that
"the tendency towards the delegation of decision-making to the lower
levels of organizational hierarchies, where economically useful on-the-
spot information is available, as well as the non-hierarchical
communication among operating units, is becoming a more discernable
phenomena on a world-wide scale, wherever conditions permit."
The business press is more graphic, referring to "the information revolution [that]
has rendered centralized, inflexible bureaucracies -- public or private -- obsolete and
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inoperative. Decentralization, individual autonomy and choice have become the
watchwords of this new era." (Schlossstein, 1990). If the omniscient control by top
management was once feared, the mood in the executive suite today is more aptly
symbolized as "Thriving on Chaos", the title of the bellwether "Handbook for a
Management Revolution" (Peters, 1988).
Coupled with the decentralization of decision-making is dramatically
increased use of pay-for-performance for lower level employees:
A few things we all used to know about pay: wage earners got paid
strictly by the hour. Salary earners got paid by the year. And
executives -- only executives -- got bonuses. It was a simple system,
seemingly logical, and it worked well for decades. Who would want to
change it? Answer: Thousands of managers who have decided that it
doesn't work well enough. (Perry, 1988).
Baker (1990a) provides data from the American Productivity & Quality Center that
75% of employers now use at least one form of "bonus" pay plan, and that 70% of
these were implemented within the past five years. A more recent survey by the
consultants Towers Perrin (1990) found that half of the monetary incentive plans for
lower level employees came into being in the past two years.
The emerging best practice has been extensively documented in field studies
by Kanter (1987, 1989a, 1989b), who dubs the collective changes the "new
managerial work". However, while she notes that "such changes come highly
recommended by the experts", she laments that "so far, theorists have given scant
attention to the dramatically altered realities of managerial work in these
transformed corporations." (Kanter, 1989a)
Is the "new managerial work" just the latest management fad or does it have
a sound basis in economic theory?
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In this paper, I establish a theoretical basis for the new work in the
information processing role of the firm. I explore the proposition that the
decentralization of decision-making and the increased use of performance pay are
both symptoms of the growth of information work associated with the burgeoning
capabilities of the new technologies for collecting and disseminating information.
Initially, I abstract from incentive consideration and show that technological
advances have reduced the costs of distributing decision-relevant information to the
work force. At the same time, the potential for more centralized decision-making
has been limited by the bounded capacity of top management to assimilate more
information, leading to an increase in the number of knowledge-workers hired. The
net result has been a decentralization of the decision-making authority. When
incentive considerations are reintroduced, I show that line workers with better
information and greater authority have greater flexibility in their actions and will
optimally receive more output-based compensation. Thus, this approach accounts
for two of the key characteristics of the new organization of work: more
decentralized decision-making and more incentive pay for line workers; and it
provides a technological basis for these organizational changes: the rise of
information technology.
1.2 The technological basis for the new organization
In looking for the basis of the current organization transformation,
information technology is an appropriate candidate for three reasons. First,
compared to other explanations, the advances in information technology have a
particularly reasonable claim to being both novel and exogenous. Many of the
fundamental technological breakthroughs that enable today's vast information
infrastructure were made less than a generation ago and were driven more by
progress in physics and engineering than business demand'. Secondly, growth in
information technology investment is of a large enough magnitude to be
economically significant. Currently, over forty percent of new capital investment in
6
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the U.S. is spent on information technology, resulting in a tenfold increase in its
share of total capital stock since 1970 (Brynjolfsson and Bimber, 1989). Meanwhile
the quality-adjusted price of computers has declined 6000-fold in the past thirty
years (Gordon, 1987). The result has been what is commonly referred to as the
"information explosion" -- the number of words of information produced for human
consumption more than doubling every eight years. (Pool, 1983)
Thirdly, there is sound basis for expecting an association between the costs of
technologies that manage information and the organization of economic activity.
The firm and the market have each been frequently modeled as primarily
information processing institutions (see Galbraith, 1977, and Hayek, 1945,
respectively). Furthermore, recent broad-sample econometric work has specifically
established the existence of strong association between investments in information
technology and important metrics of economic organization such as firm size and
vertical integration (Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani & Kambil. 1989), and the
number of managers per firm (Brynjolfsson, Malone & Gurbaxani, 1988). The
statistical relationships are consistent with case study evidence that information
technology has caused significant changes in the organization of work (Zuboff, 1988;
Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987).2
1.3 Information economics as the methodology
In suggesting that the origins of the new organization of work lie in
information technology, I am far from alone. However, I will examine an economic
interpretation for this relationship, as opposed to the sociological and political
theories that have been more common. Although the principal-agent theory on
which I draw is commonly classified under the rubric "information economics",
scholars have rarely applied it to the practical analysis of information technology
(Gurbaxani and Whang, 1989). The hope is that this approach will enable a
parsimonious and rigorous explanation of the changing organization of work.
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Furthermore, using self-interested but boundedly rational agents to model the
organization generates new insights into the implications of these changes and
highlights some fundamental similarities between the "new organization" and some
familiar old organizations.
Holmstrom makes the point that one must distinguish two types of
information costs, 1) those that result from a limited ability to process information,
and 2) the "strategic" costs associated with providing incentives for properly
transmitting or using private information.3 Most of the work in information
economics has focused on the latter (Holmstrom, 1985). Obviously, considering only
the incentive-based information costs can be misleading when applied to the case of
information technology. For instance, the mechanism design branch of agency
theory can lead one to conclude that greater centralization must inevitably result
from lower information costs (Melumad & Reichelstein, 1987).4 Similarly, most
applications of the moral hazard branch stress the idea that better information will
necessarily lead to a reduction in incentive pay (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The agency theory model I use in this paper is consistent with earlier
applications of the approach. However, the result that better information leads to
more incentive pay seems to contradict earlier results only because unlike previous
analyses, I focus on the possibility that it is the agent, not the principal, who
becomes better informed.
To understand the relative impact of improvements in information technology
on principals and agents, one must explicitly consider the limits on attention, and the
costs of information processing and transmission in general. Unfortunately, the
work on formally modeling the organizational implications of information processing
and transmission costs has been quite limited. Marschak and Radner (1972)
provided the first serious analysis using "team theory" and more recently Malone
(1987, 1988) has modelled the effect of changing these costs on a variety of
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organizational prototypes. Malone's models in particular come closer than
incentive-based models to tracking the actual organizational changes associated with
past changes technology and suggest the potential of this methodology.
Ultimately, one must consider the costs of both information processing and
incentives to understand the determinants of organizational structure. Fortunately,
when even simple adjustments are made to the basic principal-agent models to
account for the fact that human information processing capacity is finite, the theory
provides a surprisingly useful framework for understanding the organizational
changes engendered by information technology. One can reasonably model the
phenomena which comprise the new managerial work as the rational contractual
responses of self-interested parties responding to improvements in the quality of
their information 5.
1.4 Related literature on the changing organization of work
This paper has been especially motivated by the observations of Rosabeth
Kanter, who has done extensive field studies on the emerging practices. She notes
that they represent a "postentrepreneurial" ideology in that they involve the adoption
of entrepreneurial flexibility and rewards throughout even large businesses, replacing
the more bureaucratic structures that have succeeded in the past. Although she
attributes the immediate cause of the transformation to "increased competitive
pressures", it seems likely that its origins have a deeper basis. While it is true that
fiercer competition leaves less room for slack, bureaucracy and centralization are
not necessarily equivalent to slack. Until recently, the success of giants like General
Motors in managing vast bureaucracies, "rationalizing" production with extensive
planning, and achieving economies through long, dedicated production runs was
considered the prototype of excellence (Chandler, 1977). There is a near consensus
that success today requires not more aggressive application of traditional methods
but rather an entirely different approach: a culture that encourages initiative and
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innovation by employees, reduced management oversight and rules, and increased
use of performance-based rewards (Peters, 1988).
While Kanter's field work has provided one of the most comprehensive
descriptions of the new managerial work, others have described and analyzed related
aspects of the transition and advanced complementary hypotheses. Piore and Sabel
(1984) argued that mass markets are being exhausted, leading to growing instability
and the need for more flexible, specialized production and consequently less rigid
hierarchies. Using similar reasoning, Dumaine (1989) concludes that new
institutions are required to keep up with "the accelerating pace of economic change."
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that a technological time trend which facilitates
flexible manufacturing can lead to a host of other institutional changes, if one
assumes that the production function is superadditive in these factors. On the issue
of the growing use of pay for performance (a nearly ubiquitous feature of optimality
in agency models), Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) argue that the that real puzzle
is why it hasn't been used even more. Jensen argues further that the traditional
organization of public corporations inevitably provides duller incentives than the
more recent institutional innovations,6 and will eventually be eclipsed as the market
makes this more apparent (Jensen, 1989). Baker (1990a) documents the rapid
growth of pay-for-performance and argues in a principal-agent model that it could
be caused by reduced opportunities to use promotions as an alternative source of
incentives.
There are three papers that are particularly relevant to the current research.
Holmstrom's (1989) article an agency costs and innovation argues that to get
workers to innovate, firms must reduce restrictions on their activities and increase
their incentive pay. Zuboffs book (1988) provides a wealth of detail on the changes
in work organization associated with the large scale introduction of information
technology in a variety of firms. Zuboff documents a link between information
technology and improvements in workers' information and associates this with an
10
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increase in their power relative to their supervisors. Finally, Malone and Smith
(1988) analyze how the use of electronics has changed the cost structure of a
number of organizations and predict an evolutionary shift from hierarchies to
markets as a result.
1.5 Outline of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized around two questions. When will
information technology lead to decentralization of decision-making authority? How
will information technology affect the optimal incentive contracts and the use of
performance pay?
In section 2, I argue that the growing availability of inexpensive machine-
generated information can facilitate improvements in the information of line
workers. However, it has also resulted in growing complaints of "information
overload" at the top levels of management, which previous models have ignored
(Clippinger and Konsynski, 1989).7 As a result, the growth in information work has
lead to the delegation of increasing amounts of the information processing tasks to
agents. The results of the model are shown to be consistent with studies of the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of computers in various information
processing tasks, and of the growing demand for knowledge workers.
In section 3, I show that the increased information available to the agents
leads to their "empowerment" in the sense that they have more flexibility to carry
out actions. Their increased flexibility, in turn, limits the ability of the principal to
control their actions directly and leads to increased discretion and performance-
based pay while reducing hierarchical control and compensation based only on
adherence to detailed work rules.
In section 4, I conclude with a summary of the main results and a discussion
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of their implications for managerial practice.
2. Decentralizing decision-making
The scarce resource is not information, it is the processing capacity to
attend information. Attention is the chief bottleneck in organizational
activity, and the bottleneck becomes narrower and narrower as we
move to the tops of organizations.
- Simon, 1973
First, they get us to buy computers so we can get more information.
Then the computers give us more information than we can ever read.
- Bulkely, 1989
2.1 Introduction
A recent article on accounting and control systems marveled that advanced
information systems were now providing the management of one chemical plant with
the values of over 40,000 variables every two hours (Kaplan, 1989). From a political
perspective, it is easy to see the potential of information systems to radically
enhance the power of central management by enabling them make more informed
decisions and to monitor compliance with those decisions (Pfeffer, 1978).
While there have been some examples of greater centralization via
information systems, the reality of the "new managerial work", as described above,
stresses the decentralization of authority in successful firms. Even Roger Smith
acknowledged the growing consensus regarding technology, management and the
locus of decision-making on his last day at the helm of General Motors:
"Manufacturing technology is undergoing tremendous change. The whole approach
is undergoing a big revolution... You've got to get decision-making pushed down to
where the action is." ("Roger Smith Reflects", 1990)
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The new managerial work at first appears to be a paradoxical response to
advances in information systems. If top management now has access to so much
better information than before, why is there such growing pressure to reduce its
decision-making authority?
The paradox begins to fade when one recognizes that improving the
information of top management is (at best) only half the story. Although the rapid
growth in information processing has long been foreseen (Leavitt & Whisler, 1958),
the implications for organizational structure, particularly with regard to the question
of centralization versus decentralization, are more complex than was originally
thought (Attewell & Rule, 1984). On one hand, cheaper information can provide
top management with more of the data needed to make decisions, issue instructions,
and monitor the compliance of the work force. On the other hand, however, it can
provide lower level workers with the information they need to make decisions
without the need for as much top management direction. Furthermore, the growing
flood of information increasingly requires the delegation and broader distribution of
decision-making, lest it overwhelm top management.
2.1.1 The theory of the firm and the locus of decision-making
To understand why decision-making is becoming more decentralized, it is
worth looking at the reasons for centralizing in firms in the first place. The nature
of the authority relation in firms is still not well-understood by economists although
it has been over fifty years since Coase posed his seminal question: why shouldn't all
transactions be carried out through the decentralized market mechanism (Coase,
1937)? Despite the theoretical pareto-optimality of completely decentralized
decision-making (cf. Bator, 1957 and references therein) in the absence of
transaction costs, the reality is that many of the important resource allocation
decisions in the United States take place within firms, under the direction of
management's "visible hand".
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Coase (1937), Simon (1957) and Williamson (1975, 1985) have each cited the
employment relation -- workers responding to the commands of their superiors -- as
the defining characteristic of firms. Even within firms, there are varying degrees of
control exerted by top management. At its most extreme, traditional manufacturing
in the Taylorist tradition can be characterized by the rigid distinction made between
the decision-maker and the workers, the "separation of conceptualization and
execution" (Sabel, Kern and Herrigel, 1989). The philosophy is epitomized by the
"first law of scientific management" laid down at the beginning of the century: "It is
necessary in any activity to have a complete knowledge of what is to be done and to
prepare instructions as to what is to be done before the work is started...the laborer
has only to follow instructions. He need not stop to think." (Meyers, 1914, quoted in
Zuboff, 1988). In contrast, a stylized fact about the new managerial work is that fiat
is replaced by negotiation and salesmanship, to the extent that even the terms
"superior" and "subordinate" seem inappropriate (Kanter, 1989).
Under what conditions will it be efficient to centralize decision-making and
coordinate production via "commands"? Coase (1937), and more recently, Rosen
(1988) have argued that organizing production within a common firm reduces
transaction costs because it insulates agents from "high-powered", market-based
incentives and the resulting opportunism and need for haggling.
However, even under the assumption that agent's objectives are completely
aligned, it does not follow that decision-making will be centralized. The original
team theory models by Marshak and Radner (1972) had no role for commands. In
an efficient organization, the function of communication could never be to restrict
the feasible set of actions of other agents but only to distribute information that
originated at a different location than where it was needed.8 Indeed, their models
implicitly assume that even if a "command" were given, the agent, who has unlimited
information processing capacity, could invert the strategy of his superior and deduce
the information on which the command was based. However, as Geankoplos and
14
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Milgrom (1985) have pointed out, if one rejects the notion that agents can costlessly
derive the justification for any commands they receive, then the stage is set for a
model in which it is optimal for subordinates to not even try to understand the
reasons for their superior's instructions, but just obey them. Indeed, Geankoplos
and Milgrom do construct a sophisticated model that shows that it can be
informationally cheaper to give only orders to subordinates instead of all the
information that makes those orders appropriate.
At the expense of some generality, the essence of this argument can be
captured in a somewhat simpler example. If the optimal actions of n agents each
depends on the values of m parameters, then a decentralized solution would call for
m reports to each of n agents for an organizational total of mn parameter reports.
When information collection and communication are costly, a cheaper solution is for
the "boss" to collect the m reports, determine the optimal action for each of the
agents, and issue n-1 commands, for a total of m+n-1 parameter reports. This will
be unambiguously cheaper than the decentralized solution as long as 1) issuing a
command to an agent requires less transmission expense than providing the agent
with the values of the m data items, and 2) the information collection and processing
costs of the boss are no more expensive than the corresponding costs of the agents.
Centralization may also facilitate economies of scale in information collection.
Furthermore, when agents have access to noisy, but uncorrelated, signals of the true
value of the data items, m, then centralized decision-making can provide a
mechanism for pooling the signals and improving its precision. This suggests that in
an information scarce environment, centralized decision-making is a natural way to
implement the management heuristic "bring as much information to bear on each
decision".
Of course, processing all this information to come up with the optimal action
for each agent can place a heavy burden on the central decision-maker, but by doing
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so he or she can relieve the organization of the potentially costly alternative of
providing all the relevant information to each of the decentralized agents for them
to compute their own optimal actions. Instead, they need only be provided with
relatively low bandwidth "instructions". 9
Why has information technology so often lead to less centralization of
decision-making? It has affected both aspects of the logic of centralization, reducing
the costs of distributing information to the agents, and increasing the information
load, and therefore the relative processing costs, of centralized decision-making.
Each of these effects is discussed more fully in the next two sections, followed by a
discussion of the results in section 2.4.
2.2 Information technology and decentralization
Commands can be characterized as a means of economizing on the amount
of information that has to be provided to agents before they act. In the example
discussed above, centralized decision-making coupled with commands to the agents
reduced the organization's information requirements from mn parameter reports to
just m reports plus n-1 commands. Whether or not this is a substantial savings to
the organization depends critically on the extent to which agents find receiving and
interpreting a command cheaper than the cost of receiving m reports. In the
environment that gave rise to the large, relatively centralized hierarchies of the
major corporations, this was very likely to be true.
However, since the 1960s, the costs of providing many types of information to
all levels of the organization have dropped dramatically, for instance, over 6000-fold
for computer generated data (Gordon, 1987). As a result, data and reports that
were expensive to provide to the agent are now much cheaper, making
decentralization more cost effective. Applegate, Cash and Mills (1989), Zuboff
(1988) and Malone et al. (1987) find that technologies like computer databases,
16
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electronic mail, voice mail, fax, data networks and video conferencing are
increasingly being used to keep agents informed, replacing the more labor intensive
alternative of oral and written reports by middle managers, who serve primarily as
"information relays" in many organizations (Drucker, 1988). Mohrman and Von
Glinow (1990) concluded that this has had a significant effect on organizations:
[Information technology] enables information to be widely shared
throughout the organization, theoretically providing the line worker
with sufficient information to work without supervision and to make
decisions from a perspective that goes well beyond the individual job.
In the context of the previous example, if an agent can be provided with the m
parameter reports upon which his optimal action depends as cheaply as a single
command, a key advantage of centralization is negated.
In an environment of scarce and expensive information, giving extensive
decision authority to lower level agents could lead to chaos, to the extent that they
did not have access to the necessary information on which to base their decisions.
However, if it is easy for agents at all levels of the organization to obtain the
information the need, it becomes practical to also give them the decision rights
associated with that information. As Jensen and Meckling point out, decision rights
should optimally be collocated with the relevant information.
2.3 Information technology and centralization
While the preceding argument suggest that information technology reduces
the costs of decentralized decision-making, one might ask why the cheaper
information should not be used just as effectively by a central decision-maker.
Indeed, information technology has sometimes been likened to a "universal solvent"
that makes all organizational forms equally inexpensive. If there is a movement to
decentralization, however, information technology must be affecting the cost of
centralization and decentralization differentially.
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2.3.1 Facilitating centralization
Before examining some of the ways information technology may increase the
costs of centralization, it is beneficial to look at a simple model of how it can
facilitate centralization. This will provide a foundation for subsequent models, and
provide insight into those of cases in which the primary impact of information
technology has been to increase central control. For instance, an elaborate
information system used by Mrs. Fields' Cookies has enabled them to manage nearly
five hundred stores nationwide, without franchising and with little skilled labor, while
maintaining control of decisions as trivial as how much of each type of cookies to
bake each hour, based on locally collected data on market conditions. (Ostrofsky
and Cash, 1989).
Consider a firm with n agents indexed by i = {1,...,n}, each of whom receives
a quantity, mi, of information inputs or data which he transforms into decisions, di,
at a cost that is a function of the amount of information processed, c(m). The key
organizational parameter is what share of the total information to convey to each
agent.
If information technology allows the effectively costless transfer of
information between agents, then the final distribution of information need bear no
relationship to the initial distribution and therefore the distribution of decision-
making will only be a function of the agent's processing costs.
Initially, assume that information processing costs grow only proportionately
to information inputs.
ci(mi) = cimi, c(O) = 0.
The total costs of producing decisions are E cm,.
18
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In this case, it will always be optimal for only one of the agents, (the one with
lower information processing costs), to do 100% of the information processing for
the firm.10 This yields a total cost
~ci(mi) = Cmin( mi) = Cmin m i
where cmin is the cost of the most efficient agent.
This suggests that to the extent that information technology enables the
relatively free flow of information, decision-making authority should flow to
whichever agent can most cheaply process the information, while the remaining
agents simply follow his or her instructions. As in the case study discussed above,
this has sometimes been the effect of information technology on organizations
especially in relatively simple industries in which the amount of information to be
processed is not too great. Mrs. Fields stores, for instance, are essentially one-
product stores, and almost all decision-making is centralized in Park City, Utah via
the technology.
2.3.2 Multiple "centers"
Another phenomenon that has been associated with the increasing use of
information technology, especially in more complex organizations, is the rise of
specialists, who are called on for specific information processing tasks (Crowston,
Malone and Lin, 1987). A related change is rise of the "cluster organization" (Mills,
1990), in which different agents are given authority for decision-making at different
times, depending on the circumstances. While particular types of decision in such
organizations are centralized, taken as a whole, authority is decentralized.
These organizational changes can be easily derived from the above model if
one relaxes the assumption that the same agent will be the low cost processor for all
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types of data. That is:
ci(m) < cj(m), for one type of data
but
cj(m) < c(m), for a different type of data
As information technology reduces the cost of informing agents, different
components will optimally be sent to different agents. Each item will go to the
agent who is the more efficient processor for that particular type of data, that is, to
the "specialist" in that area. In this case, instead of just one "center" there will be
multiple centers, depending on how many different specialists exist.
There is still the question of making sure that each data item gets to the right
"specialist". A central department can sift through all the data and allocate it those
it thinks will benefit from it, but then an additional layer of processing must be
added. A brute force alternative is simply to make all the company's data available
to all the agents, who select out those components relevant to their decisions.
Unless the agents have a way of knowing what each other are working on, this can
lead to duplication or leave some items unexamined.
To some extent, technology is increasingly be used to address this
coordination problem by enhancing the capacity of the organization to deliver the
appropriate information directly to line workers, without going through the
bottleneck of the traditional chain of command. For instance, Applegate, Cash and
Mills (1989) find that increasingly:
Computers will also help identify who in the company has the
expertise needed to work on a particular problem. Data bases of
employees' skills and backgrounds will ensure that the mix of talent
can be tailor-made for every task that arises.
To the extent that information technology makes it easier to contact and
20
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work with a broader set of individuals on new projects, it provides further incentives
for specialization. Effectively the market for agent's services is broadened, and as
the theorem "the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market" (Smith,
1776; Stigler, 1951) suggests, a finer specialization can be supported. The only
caveat is that the use of technology thus far is primarily intra-organizational, and the
theorem requires that agents face compensation is at least partially output-
contingent, so that they will correctly direct their efforts.
Even within firms, the use of technology to coordinate decision-making
among various experts is still in its infancy. Only recently has the field of "computer
supported cooperative work" been established (see Malone, 1988). Furthermore,
many problems are not easily decomposable, as they must be if the processing of the
data set is to be effectively distributed.
To the extent that the problem of decomposing and allocating the data is not
costless, one might still expect to see centralization of decision-making. The fewer
the number of agents involved in decision-making, the less need for inter-agent
coordination. There is some evidence that this is an important effect in that
businesses are reluctant to hire two part-time managers to do the work of one full-
time manager. But businesses also spend a great deal of money training different
employees to become experts in different areas. This would seem to increase
coordination costs because information must now be allocated to more agents. In
the context of the model presented thus far, the firm would be expected to
concentrate all its training on one promising agent who could then become the most
efficient at all types of information processing. Presumably, the reason firms do not
do this is that all agents have limited processing capacity; the costs of processing
information eventually become very large as the load increases. This suggests the
following modification of the model to take into account the limits on the processing
capacity of agents.
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2.3.3 The costs of centralization
In the initial enthusiasm to exploit the enormous power of computers, there
was a tendency to focus on centralizing information systems to give top management
access to as much information as possible (Simon, 1973). Little consideration was
give to conserving the processing capacity, or attention, of managers. As Simon has
argued, this strategy is implicitly based on the "assumptions of a past society where
information rather than attention was the scarce resource." While shifting
information about all the firm's operations to a central location can be optimal when
agent's processing capacity is unbounded, the need for decentralization arises when
the costs of processing all information centrally begin to rise due to capacity
constraints. Indeed, the assumption made earlier that human information processing
can scale up proportionately is not realistic for very large loads. No one imagines
that any single manager of the chemical plant mentioned above could possibly
analyze and make decisions based on all 40,000 data items received every two hours.
Aggregation and summary statistics can sometimes help, but much knowledge is
"specific" and thus becomes worthless when aggregated. Furthermore, a firm that
simply ignores the additional information, while avoiding the costs of additional
information work, is likely to incur substantial opportunity costs by forgoing chances
to profit in new markets, to reduce costs or simply to remain competitive with more
enterprising rivals. As a result, the growth in data collected is likely to represent a
real, if not always proportional, growth in information to be processed."
The notion of bounded rationality suggests that the cost of processing
information by any individual will rise without limit as the amount of information to
be processed increases. Adding this condition negates the feasibility of the
centralized decision-making schemes that are otherwise very attractive theoretically.
Instead, an organization with higher information processing requirements is likely to
become more decentralized. This is because human information processing
capabilities, unlike those of machines, come in relatively constant granularity.' 2
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Beyond some point, additional capabilities are only available by increasing the
number of people involved. Although bounded rationality is notoriously hard to
model, the following simple example suffices to provide graphic intuition for this
basic point.
Consider the two agent case of the model presented above. Even when we
assume as before that agent 1 (the "manager") has an initial cost advantage over
agent 2 (a "worker"): c < c2, complete centralization does not necessarily follow if
costs eventually rise with increase load.
To model this, unlike the previous case, we introduce a simple form of
bounded rationality constraining the information processing capacity of each agent:
costs of information processing are convex beyond some point, c" > 0, and in the
limit, the marginal costs of processing information tend to infinity. For concreteness,
consider the quadratic cost function:
ci(m) cm + /2kmi 2
with arbitrary positive constants c and k.
Minimizing costs implies the following first order condition:
C1 + klm = c2 + k2m 2
for all positive values of ml and m 2.
Defining the total quantity of information processed by the firm as z (- m +
m2), one can rewrite the constraint as:
m = (c 2-cl)/(kl+k 2) + [k 1 /(kl+k 2)]z
or
ml = a + z
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where
and
a _= (c 2-c)/(kl +k 2 )
B3 k 2/(k 1+k 2)
By assumption, c < c2 and kj, k2 > 0, implying that a > 0 and 0 < 13 < 1.
The first order constraint will not be binding for z < k2a/kl13. Up to this
point all information will be processed by the agent 1. However, as information
processing requirements grow beyond this point, a share (1 - 3) will be off-loaded to
the higher cost agent. (See figure 1)
Figure 1: The Increase In the share of processing
off-loaded, quadratic cost case with k2 < k1.
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The effect is readily generalized to more than two agents. Even if some
agents start of with lower costs, as their load increases, their marginal cost will
increase until it becomes more efficient to use additional processors. Thus, in the
presence of limits on processing capacity, as the information load grows, more of the
work is shifted to agents that previously did no information processing and
proportionately less is done centrally.
The intuition behind this simple example is straightforward. Distributing
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information work may be optimal not because of any inherent organizational
efficiencies, but simply as a response to the limited ability of any one human mind
to do more than some finite amount of information processing. Given the fact that
the ability of humans to absorb and process information varies over a relatively
narrow band 3, at least compared to computers, this suggests that if organizations
get closer to the theoretical limit of human information processing (i.e. when all its
members spend 100% of their time processing information), information work will
necessarily be more evenly spread throughout the organization. This does not mean
that decisions made at all levels will be "equally important", but it does mean that
more agents will be taking action based on their own information and decisions, as
opposed to simply following instructions from superiors. Unlike the previous model,
this model is consistent with the notion that it is advantageous for the firm to
distinguish between different types of information processing, perhaps based on
areas of expertise, so that the load could be more evenly distributed. Only when the
firm does very limited information processing can decision-making be fully
centralized.
It should be noted that when the agents do not all share a common objective
function, agency costs will also have to be considered and these will not necessarily
be the same for agents who simply follow instructions as for those who decide their
actions for themselves. Indeed, as discussed in section 3 below, the agency costs of
getting informed agents to work in the firm's interest will generally be higher than
the agency costs of enforcing adherence to instructions by less informed agents.
While this puts an additional cost on decentralized decision-making, it does not
qualitatively affect the preceding analysis. As information processing requirements
grow, decentralization will still tend to dominate under the assumption that the
marginal cost of processing by individual agents, c', tends to infinity, while agency
cost of delegation are bounded. The organizational trade-off is between having the
additional information processing done centrally, thereby saving on agency costs or
having it decentralized, and economizing on the capacity of any one agent. The
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agency costs of delegation will in general be increasing in the amount of information
the agent has, but they are bounded as long as the agent is not infinitely risk-
averse.14 In contrast, the costs of increasing the load on any one individual must
tend to infinity -- no one can work more than twenty-four hours per day -- so with
an increasing information load, the costs of centralization must eventually surpass
the costs of decentralization.
2.4 Discussion: Technology, information and work
The conclusion that information processing must ultimately become more
distributed as the information processing load increases depends critically on the
assumption that the capacity of agents to process information does not grow even
faster than the load. The responses of organizations to the introduction of
information technology, including the increasing decentralization of decision-making,
as well as growing complaints by executives of "information overload" and increased
numbers of "knowledge workers" employed by organizations, suggest that the
information explosion is indeed putting a strain on human information processing
capacity.
Faced with a growing flood of potentially valuable information, the executive
has three choices. He can use technology to enhance his ability to process
information, he can ignore the information and the opportunities implicit in it, or he
can delegate its analysis to another person.
2.4.1 The nature of information technology
Information technology has vastly reduced the costs of collecting, storing and
transmitting information, but it has had less of an impact on the equally necessary
steps in the information processing chain involving decision-making and judgement
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(Van Zandt, 1990). This is not to say that there are not many tasks now done by
computers that could formerly be done only by humans. Automation has
unquestionable reduced the need for human labor in a number of aspects of the
firm's production. However, because machines excel at following well-defined
algorithms or rules, and playing out predictable scenarios (Penzias, 1989), the tasks
automated are often precisely the ones that formerly could most easily be delegated
to subordinates anyway, so the net result is not much of a savings at the "bottleneck"
of decision-making. Instead, the consequence is a decline in work that is
"delegatable" to other people via detailed instructions and an increase in relative
share of "knowledge work" that must be done. In particular, the aspects of human
decision-making that involve judgement, handling exceptions, and pattern recognition
are recognized as being particularly hard to automate. As a result, it would be a
mistake to presume that human and machine information processing are substitutes
for one another in those areas of the firm where information overload is most
serious. New technologies are replicating more of the decision-making capabilities
of humans' 5, but for the foreseeable future, computers and humans will continue
to have markedly different strengths, and this has lead to a natural division of labor
in which computers typically provide information to humans who in turn analyze the
information and make decisions.
To the extent that these tasks are each necessary for problem-solving, or at
least complementary, the decline in the price of one will lead to increased demand
for the other. This is exactly what seems to be happening. For instance, consider a
firm that could increase profits by $400,000 by analyzing 40,000 items of data. If the
data items cost $10 each to collect, store and transmit, then there is no point
gathering or processing them. But if the data items cost only $9.00 to collect, store
and transmit to an analyst, then the firm will willing to spend up to $40,000 to hire
an analyst. As the cost of "information" declines, the demand for "judgement"
increases, to the extent they are complementary in nature.
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Even a machine processing advance that, in isolation, appears to decrease the
requirements for human information processing, can ultimately lead to an increase
in human information processing in equilibrium as the firm shifts to more
information-intensive ways of doing business.16 Furthermore, when a firm's
competitors, suppliers or customers increase their information processing
throughput, they put renewed demands on the firm's own capabilities. For instance,
Wall Street firms have been describe as waging a veritable "arm's race" of
information processing technology (Wall Street Computer Review, 1990).
2.4.2 Evidence of "information overload"
The increasing availability of information that can be profitably attended to,
coupled with no corresponding increase automated decision-making or in hours in
the day, has created a growing sense of "information overload". According to Stalk
and Hout, (1990) and Clippinger and Konsynski, (1989), the information-starved top
executives of the 1950s have been supplanted by the information-flooded and time
starved executives of the 1990s, largely because of advances in technology. Similarly,
Bulkely (1989) bemoans the consequences of "data overload: computer users get[ing]
too much of a good thing". The sense of overload is consistent with statistics that
show that between 1960 and 1977, the number of words made available to
Americans through 17 major communications channels grew by 8.9% annually, while
the number of words actually read grew at less than 1/3 that rate (Pool, 1983). Pool
finds that much of the growth in information generated is as a result of a switch
from print to electronic media, and that most of the relatively small growth in
consumption is accounted for by the shift from blue- to white-collar employment and
the rise in educational levels. Interestingly, he also detects an significant increase in
the proportion of point-to-point communications as opposed to mass media. The
intuition that cheaper transmission of information coupled with relatively modest
advances in the ability of humans receivers to process information will lead to
information overload has been formalized by Van Zandt (1990).17 The
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opportunity costs of missing valuable information because of overload can be
substantial.
2.4.3 Evidence of the rise in knowledge work
A recent analysis of occupational data (Loveman, 1989), found that the share
of skilled workers has increased dramatically in recent years in the United States,
Germany, and Britain, and that this increase is closely associated with the
introduction of new technologies and organizational forms. Furthermore, despite a
significant increase in the supply of college-educated people entering the workforce,
their wage premium over less skilled workers has not declined, implying a shift in
relative labor demand. This is consistent with increased information processing
requirements in firms, and confirms earlier studies that found an increasing share of
the labor force is engaged in occupations requiring high skills (Swasy and Hymowitz,
1990) and in information work in general (Porat, 1977).
While there have been substantial declines in the relative demand for blue
collar workers (Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman, 1989), the evidence does not
suggest that computers have (as yet) significantly reduced the demand for even low-
level information workers. As late as the mid-1970s, investments in computers were
found to be associated with a complementary increase in the employment of even
the clerical workers whose jobs were thought to be most vulnerable automation
(Osterman, 1986).
While the growth in the share of knowledge workers in firms is in some sense
prima facia evidence of more decentralized information processing, there is evidence
that job classifications understate the decentralization of decision-making in the firm.
There are widespread reports that employees have increased responsibilities even
without any changes in their titles (Halal, 1986; Zuboff, 1988). The situation at
AT&T is typical:
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Cathy Ann Gallo, manager of AT&T's Phone Center in Summit, N.J.,
used to need approval before she could do something as simple as
replace a broken phone. Now, higher level managers...do not have
time to flash green and red lights on all decisions. "I've been
empowered to do whatever makes my customers happy, " Ms. Gallo
said. (Deutsch, 1990)
One key aspect of the new managerial work is the decentralization of
decision-making authority. In this section we've seen how the increased information
processing opportunities available to the firm, coupled with the bounded capacity of
any one person, naturally leads to more distributed decision-making.
Another key aspect of the new work is increased use of performance
incentives. As Jack Grubman, Paine Webber's telecommunication analyst, said of
the AT&T restructuring described above, "They've made culture change a
pocketbook issue and that's a really smart move". AT&T now offers profit-sharing
to all its employees and pay is more closely linked to performance. Before, "AT&T
workers used to be judged on how well they follow orders." (Deutsch, 1990)
In section 3, I show why performance pay must also be increased when the
information available to employees increases.
3. Optimal incentive contracts for information workers
An individual without information cannot take responsibility; an
individual who is given information cannot help but take responsibility.
- Jan Carlzon (1987)
Leaders in the new organization do not lack motivational tools, but the
tools are different from those of traditional corporate bureaucrats.
The new rewards are based not on status but on contribution, and they
consist not of regular promotion and automatic pay raises but of...a
share of the glory and the gains of success.
- Rosabeth Kanter (1989)
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Under what conditions will firms optimally pay fixed wages for the
completion of prespecified tasks? When will incentive pay be required? As
suggested in the previous section, the answers to these questions depend critically on
the information available to the firm and to the worker. In particular, when the
information available to the firm (hereafter referred to as the "principal") is a
superset of the information available to the worker (the "agent"), no performance
pay for the agent is required in the optimal contract. The agent will simply be
compensated for the input he provides: work effort. However, when the agent has
information that the principal doesn't, the optimal contract will include a component
of compensation that is linked to the consequences of the agent's actions, the
output. This is true even when those consequences are partly beyond the agent's
control.' 8 It is worth noting that in traditional hierarchies, supervisors are
generally presumed to know more about the job than the people being supervised
do. In contrast, the new managerial work typically involves employees who often
have more information about the work than their managers.
The situation in which an agent working for a principal obtains private
knowledge relevant to their relationship is commonly referred to as "moral
hazard".' 9 Moral hazard problems can be further classified as either problems of
"hidden action" or "hidden information". In hidden action problems, both parties
have the same knowledge about the state of nature20 , but the principal does not
have precise knowledge about the action (or effort level) of the agent. In hidden
information problems, the agent's actions are observable, but they may be based on
information available only to the agent, so only he knows whether they were truly
appropriate.
The information and production technologies of the firm are the primary
determinants of the relative amounts of information available to the principal and
the agent. In particular, information technology can be used to increase the relative
information of the principal, and if she21 is able to absorb and use the additional
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information, this will make fixed wage contracts more feasible. As discussed in
section II, however, the information explosion can also lead to a greater reliance on
decentralized information processing, which would tend to exacerbate moral hazard
problems.
In this section, I discuss how changes in the information structure of the firm
lead to concomitant changes in the optimal contracts between firms and their
workers. I begin with a discussion of why performance based pay is unnecessary
when the principal has all the information that the agent does, but becomes
necessary when the agent has private information. I then examine the role of
information systems in affecting the relative information of the principal and agent.
Next, I present a model demonstrating the optimality of increasing performance-
based pay when the amount of the agent's private information increases. Section 3.4
extends the results to the multidimensional case, in the spirit of Holmstrom and
Milgrom's (1990) model. I wrap up with a qualification of the meaning of
performance pay and a summary of the results of this section.
3.1 Forcing contracts and incentive contracts
3.1.1 Symmetric Information
When the agent's effort level is fully observable and the agent and the
principal have symmetric information -- neither party knows the true state before
the agent's action, or alternatively, both do -- then the optimal contract does not
require any "performance pay" to motivate the right actions by the agent.
When neither party has knowledge of the true state before the effort level is
chosen, the optimal effort level can be calculated in advance by the principal.22 If
the principal is effectively risk-neutral (for instance, if the firm is "large" or because
its shareholders can diversify their risk), and the agent is risk-averse, then a "forcing
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contract" that pays a flat wage to the agent for meeting or exceeding a prespecified
effort level and nothing for falling short of this level will achieve the first best level
of effort and risk sharing (Harris and Raviv, 1979). This can be likened to the
typical authority and compensation relationship of a "traditional" firm, in which the a
supervisor determines what work must be done and pays a flat wage to the
employee contingent on his action, but not on the outcome. The agent's pay is not
affected by the ultimate impact of his actions on the firm's output. All of the risk
will be born by the principal. "23
When the state is known to both parties before the agent chooses his effort
level, pay will vary more, but in a fairly straightforward way. The principal can
calculate the optimal effort level for the state that actually obtains by requiring that
the marginal benefit of any additional effort just equals the extra costs incurred. As
above, the agent will be paid only for meeting, or exceeding, the level prespecified
by the principal. Although the principal may require a different level of effort in
each state, she will also adjust the agent's pay just enough to precisely compensate
him for the change in effort requirements, leaving him with constant utility
regardless of the actual state.
This situation -- a fully informed principal who specifies exactly the actions to
be taken by the agent and pays a wage that provides a constant utility level to the
agent -- achieves the "first-best" levels of output and risk-sharing, meaning that
given the available information, no change in the effort levels or the way output is
apportioned between the parties can make both parties better off.
The authority and compensation relations in the full information case are
similar to those in the no information case. The supervisor specifies the tasks to be
completed and the agent is paid a fixed wage for a given job. The main difference
is that as the complexity of the environment and pace of change increase,
management will have to prespecify an increasing number of contingent tasks. As a
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result, enforcing the optimal contract in the full information case can tax the
information processing capacity of the supervisor and will require complex, complete
contracts and work rules that can limit flexibility and initiative.
3.1.2 Asymmetric Information
In contrast to the symmetric information cases, when the agent has
information about his actions or the state of nature that the principal does not, it
may be necessary to provide incentives for the optimal action by basing
compensation on output. In general, it will not be possible to achieve the "first best"
levels of both effort and risk-sharing that were possible when the principal had no
less information than the agent. Although the exact form of the compensation
scheme is very sensitive to the assumptions made about the production technology
and the precise information available to each party, typically the agent will be paid a
bonus for good outcomes and have his pay reduced for bad outcomes, even though
the outcomes are only partly within his control. 25 The problem is that the principal
cannot insure the agent against events beyond his control without also eliminating
the agent's incentive to choose the right level of effort.
An extensive literature documents the fact that these agency problems can be
quite significant. Generally the only way for the principal to completely eliminate
the agency problems is to improve her information. This creates a role for
monitoring information about the agent's actions or the environment, but also
increases the cognitive load on the principal.
3.2 The role of information
3.2.1 Information systems and control
Research on the value of information in moral hazard problems has
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emphasized the following proposition: any signal that potentially provides
information about an agent's action, (up to a sufficient statistic), will have positive
value and should, in general, be included in the optimal contract (Holmstrom, 1979).
The basic results of this literature have often been stylized as a trade-off between
the costs of better information systems versus the higher agency costs of outcome-
based contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1988).
For instance:
"The principal has two options (Demski & Feltham, 1978): (1) to
discover the agent's behavior by investing in information or (2) to
contract at least partially on the basis of the outcomes of the agent's
behavior." (Eisenhardt, 1988)
This view stresses that the need for performance pay would be eliminated if
the principal had good enough information to monitor the agent's actions. Ideally,
the principal could tell the agent exactly what to do, and write a "forcing" contract
that got the agent to do it, without any recourse to outcome-based compensation
schemes that transfer risk to the agent. This suggests that the imperfection of
information systems is what makes performance-pay, and the attendant agency costs,
necessary.
With proper incentives, the agent will voluntarily reveal the private
information that the principal seeks. Of course this requires access to a
communication channel, but this can be a cost-effective alternative when monitoring
is impossible, or very expensive. Considerable progress has been made in
understanding under what conditions the principal can induce the agent to voluntary
reveal his private information.
An important implication of this research is that in the absence of
communication costs, "any mechanism involving delegation of decision making can,
without loss of performance, be replaced by a completely centralized mechanism"
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(Melumad & Reichelstein, 1987). This is commonly referred to as the "revelation
principle" and simplifies enormously the theoretical analysis of alternative
mechanisms for organizing economic activity. 26 The key point in Melumad &
Reichelstein's paper is that, given certain incentive and spanning conditions:7 , the
principal can always "reverse engineer" the agent's private nformation from the
action that the agent took, so for ease of modelling, one can assume that the agent
directly reveals his private information. While the revelation principle was
developed as an aid to theory development, Green notes that "it has been suggested
that the revelation principle may serve as a practical basis for the design of
particular institutions" (E. Green, 1984). For instance, Kirby draws the following
implication from Melumad & Reichelstein's work: "...the larger the costs of
communication, ceteris paribus, the more likely that the organization will prefer a
delegated decision mechanism over a communication-based centralization
mechanism." (Kirby, 1987)
3.2.2 Information technology and delegation
The agency literature on reductions in monitoring and communication costs
can be interpreted to show that improvements in the quality of information and
communication technologies will necessarily lead to greater centralization. This
conclusion, however, is wrong. The principal may not want better information on
the agent's actions or knowledge. Providing the principal with better information is
only valuable to the extent that she can process it. But as was shown in section II,
the whole reason for hiring agents to do information work in the first place may be
to alleviate the information processing load on the principal. It would make no
sense to hire a middle manager or specialist and then make all the decisions for
him. Yet this is precisely the implied solution of the argument for increasing the
principal's information in the agency literature. Similarly, the "panopticon" approach
of using information technology to monitor workers implicit in much of the literature
on applied information systems makes less sense when the principal is already
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overburdened with data. The critical, if generally unstated, assumption underlying
the revelation principal and much of the more recent work is that the principal has
unlimited, costless information processing capacity. This assumption is not
appropriate for organizations of information workers.
More informed agents
While the above approaches are useful in explaining circumstances in which
information technology is used to more closely monitor workers, there is an
alternative case: information technology that is used primarily to increase the
information available to the agents. In section II, it was found that when the ability
of the principal to assimilate and use new information is not infinite, an increased
information processing load will tend to be more broadly distributed to the agents.
When information technology increases the need for human information processing
in this way, it can create, or exacerbate the need for performance pay associated
with hidden information moral hazard problems.
Work that is less observable
Furthermore, information technology can also make it harder for the
principal to monitor the agents actions, thereby creating or exacerbating hidden
action moral hazard problems. For one thing, it is generally much harder to gauge
the effort level of an agent engaged in mental work than physical work and as a
recent report concluded: 'The computer-based technologies of the future will place
even greater demands on the mental rather than the physical capabilities of factory
and office workers", (Cyert & Mowery, 1989). Zuboff (1988) documented the
frustration of factory managers at 'Tiger Creek" who were no longer able to judge
the effort level of their subordinates when the job content changed from physical
activities to making decisions in a computer automated factory. At the same time,
information technology has often made it easier to tabulate and record the physical
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output that ultimately results from an agent's actions.
Greater flexibility
In many organizations, there is also an increase in the number of different
types of activities performed by each agent as computers enable flexible
manufacturing (Sabel, Kern & Herrigan, 1989) A principal may have a harder time
monitoring agents who engage in a broad variety of activities because good summary
information cannot be as easily created. As Kaplan (1989) stresses, overhead
monitoring and management costs increase rapidly as the number of activities
increases and product cycles shorten.
3.2.3 Summary of information technologv's effects
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the potential impacts of
information technology on the optimal contracts between workers and firms are
varied. Information systems can be used to improve monitoring, enabling the
principal to take more control of the agent's actions and mitigating the need for
performance pay. But as a practical matter, the growth of information systems can
also increase relative information available to agents and the flexibility that they
have in choosing their activities. Each of these effects have been observed following
the introduction of information technology (Attewell and Rule, 1984).
3.3 Performance pay as a response to improved agent information
While improvements in the information of the principal have been formally
analyzed extensively in the agency literature, far less attention has been paid to the
organizational impacts of improving the agent's information and flexibility. Below, I
show how increasing the agent's information about the state of the world can
necessitate an increase in the output-based component of his compensation.
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Surprisingly, this is true even when the information that the agent gathers has no
value to the principal and she is not attempting to benefit from it. In section 3.4. I
show how giving the agent new options, either explicitly, or as a result of improved
information, can negate the effectiveness of incentive contracts based on fewer agent
options. Like the first model, the multidimensional model demonstrates that the
optimal contract requires an increase in the output-based component of pay.
While these results are in many ways diametrically opposite to those of the
previous literature which emphasized improving the principal's information, they
follow from reasonable assumptions and are consistent with many of the actual
changes in organization.
3.3.1 The basic model
The basic idea is to consider a moral hazard problem with both hidden
actions and hidden information; the agent obtains some private information which
affect his unobservable choice of effort level. As the agent's information improves,
he is able to distinguish among states of nature that previously were lumped
together. Because he can now condition his actions on more distinct states, his
flexibility increases. In particular, with better information in the Blackwell sense, the
space of state-contingent actions available to the agent is a strict superset of his
previous action-space. Note that this is true even if the number of actual, "physical"
actions does not change. This is illustrated for the 2-state, 2-action case in figure 2.
The increase in flexibility enabled by the improved information can be very
valuable to the extent it allows the agent to tailor his actions to specific
circumstances and thus pushes out the frontier of production possibilities. However,
there is also a second, less obvious effect. The agent's increased flexibility makes it
harder for the principal to predict and control his actions. The narrow, specific
instructions and rewards that worked before may now end up being counter
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Figure 2: How Information Can Empower
Increasing the number of
state-contingent options
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Shirk, If Good
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productive because they prevent the agent from taking full advantage of his
information, or worse yet, they may encourage the agent to "game" the system by
meeting the letter of the instructions in ways that were not intended.28 As a result,
the principal will find it increasingly necessary to pay the agent as a function of the
net output of the agent's actions, even if some aspects of this output are beyond the
agent's control. This can lower welfare as opportunities for risk-sharing between the
agent and the principal are diminished.
In principle, these two effects, 1) a greater production set but 2) more
difficulty in controlling the agent, are separable. For instance, as demonstrated
below, it is entirely possible for the improvement in information to do nothing to
increase production possibilities yet still decrease the ability of the principal to
control the agent.
The optimal contract can be analyzed as a constrained maximization problem
for the principal. Maximize her utility subject to two types of constraints 1) the
agent must get some minimum level of utility (the participation or individual
rationality constraint: "IR") and 2) the agent must find it in his interest to do the
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posited actions given his information (incentive compatibility constraints: "IC"). The
main effect of the agent's improved information will be on the IC constraints. The
increased flexibility of the agent means that the principal must satisfy additional IC
constraints lest the agent choose an action other than the optimal one. Meeting
these additional constraints will, in general, require more incentive pay and worse
risk-sharing.29
This effect can be illustrated in a model with two randomly determined states
of nature ( E {B,G}), two levels of effort chosen by the agent (a {L, H}) and two
possible outcomes (x {0,1)). The probability of a successful outcome (x = 1) is a
function of both the agent's action and the state of nature.
prob(x=1) = p(a, O)
The states and effort levels can be ordered so that the probability of a
successful outcome is higher for good states and high effort levels, ceteris paribus.
p(L, ) < p(H, ), (1)
and p(. ,B) < p(. ,G).
Initially, neither the agent nor the principal knows the true state. All they
know is that the prior probability of the good state ( = G) is q (0 < q < 1). Only
the agent knows whether his effort was high or low.
Although high effort is more likely to yield a successful outcome, it comes at
a cost to the agent of e, as measured in the agents utiles. Without loss of generality,
the cost of low effort can be normalized to zero.
c(H) = e, c(L) = 0
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Finally, we must specify the utility functions of the principal and the agent.
principal: x - s(x)
agent: u(s(x)) - c(a), u' > 0, u" < 0.
where s(x) is the share of output going to the agent.
The agent will not agree to any contract that doesn't at least meet his
reservation utility of u. Note that the principal is risk neutral while the agent is risk-
averse. This could result if the principal, usually thought of as a firm owner, has
more opportunity to diversify her risk in this relationship than does the agent.
We will analyze the case in which effort is sufficiently productive that the
benefits of high effort outweigh the costs. regardless of the true state. This allows us
to concentrate on the control aspects of the problem insofar as additional
information about the state will not change the socially optimal action.
e < u[p(H,B) - p(L,B)] and e < u[p(H,G) - p(L,G)]. (2)
3.3.2 Solutions to the model
If the principal could observe the level of the agent's effort and write a
contract on it, the socially optimal solution of high effort could be obtained without
requiring the agent to face any risk. Conditional on the agent working hard, the
principal would simply pay the agent a flat wage sufficiently high to fully compensate
the agent for exerting high effort. The principal would bear all the risk that the
outcome might still not be successful.
However, given the fact that the principal cannot know whether the agent has
worked hard, she must make it in the agent's interest to do so on his own. The
incentive contract can only be conditioned on things that are observable to both the
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principal and the agent. In this case only the actual outcome qualifies. Accordingly,
the incentive contract must have at most two components and can be written in the
form:
s(x) = { + , ifx = 1
a, if x = O
The agent now risks losing his bonus, , if it turns out that x = 0. If the
agent exerts high effort, he can improve the chances that x = 1 (from equation (1))
and consequently his expected pay increases. For a high enough value of B, the
agent will have sufficient incentive to exert high effort. The principal will seek to
keep 3 to a minimum, however, to avoid exposing the agent to unnecessary risk.
Any additional risk the agent faces will require an increase in his average pay (by
Jensen's inequality) to compensate him and keep him from falling below his
reservation utility. The amount of the base salary, a, will be set so that, taking into
account the agent's effort and this risk premium, the expected value of the agent's
earnings will not be below his reservation utility. The exact values of a and that
maximize the principal's profits can be derived by solving the following program:
Max E(x - s(x)).s(x)
s.t. IR: [(1-q)p(H,B) + qp(H,G)]u(a + 3)
+ [1- [(1-q)p(H,B) + qp(H,G)]]u(a) - e
> u
IC: [(1-q)p(H,B) + qp(H,G)]u(a + 3)
+ [1- [(1-q)p(H,B) + qp(H,G)]]u(a) - e
> [(1-q)p(B) + qp(LG)]u(a + B)
+ [1- [(1-q)p(LB) + qp(LG)]]u(a) (3)
where E(.) is the expectations operator.
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Given that high effort is to be induced, this is equivalent to finding the
combination of salary and bonus that minimizes expected pay, but still leaves the
agent with sufficient incentive to work hard.
Min E(s(x))
a.B
s.t. IR: [(1-q)p(H,B) + qp(H,G)]u(c + )
+ [1- [(1-q)p(H,B) + qp(H,G)]]u(a) - e
u
IC: [(1-q)p(H,B) + qp(H,G)]u(a + 3)
+ [1 - [(1-q)p(H,B) + qp(H,G)]]u(a) - e
> [(1-q)p(L,B) + qp(L,G)]u(a + )
+ [1- [(1-q)p(L,B) + qp(L,G)]]u(a) (3)
At the optimum, both these constraints will be binding. In particular, the
optimal value of B, denoted *, will be set to equate the expected marginal utility
from working to the disutility of effort.
3.3.3 The introduction of an information system
Now consider how the optimal contract changes when the agent (but not the
principal) is using a stylized information system. The information system enables the
agent to know whether the state of nature is good or bad before deciding what level
of effort to exert. One could think of it as a customer profiling system whose use
has been delegated to a sales agent; by using the system, the sales agent can
determine whether a potential customer is "good-natured" or "bad-natured" before
deciding whether to give his pitch.
Although most of the preceding analysis remains unchanged with the
introduction of the information system, there is one key change. Because the agent
knows what the state is before acting, he can follow a strategy that differs between
good states and bad states. As discussed earlier, the improved information has
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increased his set of state-contingent options. Because the principal wants the agent
to work in both good and bad states, she must now make it incentive compatible for
the agent to do so. Before she only had to make working hard in the agent's
interest in expectation, generating one incentive compatibility constraint (3). With
the information system, the following two IC constraints replace constraint (3).
IC(B): p(H,B)u(a + ) + [1- p(H,B)]u(a) - e
> p(L,B)u(a + 3) + [1- p(L,B)]u(a)
IC(G): p(H,G)u(a + 13) + [1- p(H,G)]u(a) - e
> p(L,G)u(a + 3) + [1- p(L,G)]u(a)
Because effort is less productive in the bad state than in the good state, the
first constraint, IC(B), will be harder to satisfy than the second constraint, IC(G).
This means that higher bonuses will have to be paid to induce effort when the agent
knows he is in the low state. However, since the principal does not know what the
true state is, she must pay this same higher bonus in the good state as well.30
Furthermore, because the expectations operator is convex, the constraint IC(B) will
also be harder to satisfy than the IC constraint in the previous case (3), when the
agent had no information system.
The bonus in the informed agent case is thus higher than the bonus required
to motivate the uninformed agent. The additional IC constraints generated by the
improvements in the agent's information have made him harder to control.
Note that the agent does not benefit from the higher bonuses required. Since
the informed agent will, on average, be getting more pay in the form of bonuses, the
principal will lower his base salary somewhat, once again leaving him at his
reservation utility.
3.3.4 Extending the model
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As the agent's information continues to improve, the proportion of his pay
which is performance-based increases monotonically. To see this, consider a
progressively better information systems that provide the agent with finer partitions
of the state-space. Instead of only identifying 2 states, the agent can identify n
distinct states, each of which has a different probability of success given high effort.
As the number of distinct states identifiable to the agent increases, the principal
must satisfy more and more incentive compatibility constraints. The constraint for
the state with the lowest marginal product of effort will be binding and will
determine how large a bonus must be paid to assure that, in expectation, the agent
still finds it worthwhile to work in that state. To see that the bonus is increasing
with better agent information, normalize the agent's utility to zero when no bonus is
paid and u(R3) when the bonus is paid. The bonus is paid whenever the outcome is
positive, which, for simplicity, we can assume occurs with probability pi in state i, if
high effort is exerted and probability zero otherwise. Thus, pi is the marginal
product of effort in state i. If we define 3* as the level of bonus required to
maintain incentive compatibility in the state with the lowest marginal product of
success, we have:
u(J*) = e/Pmi,
where Pmin is the marginal product of effort in the "worst" state.
To see that B* is increasing in the number of states discernable to the agent,
note that u() is monotonically positive, e is a constant, and the expected value of
Pmin is decreasing in n according to the following relationship:
Pmin= pn[1 - F(p)]" ' f(p) dp
J
where F(p) and f(p) are the distribution and density of marginal products
across states, and n is the number of states discernable.
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Figure 3 shows how the bonus increases with better information for the case
in which the probability of success is uniformly distributed.
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Welfare is not necessarily enhanced by improvements in information. From
the above analysis, one can see that if the productivity of effort in the worst state is
sufficiently high, the principal will provide incentives for the agent to exert high
effort, regardless of his information. In this case, the information has no effect on
production decisions and does not expand the production set in any meaningful way.
However, the information does destroy some risk-sharing opportunities; the agent
now receives proportionately more output-contingent pay. Thus, in this case, the net
effect of better information is to lower welfare.
On the other hand, if productivity in some states is sufficiently low, it will be
preferable for the agent not to work in those states, thereby avoiding effort that
would have been unnecessarily wasted in the absence of the information system.
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The principal can give the agent discretion to choose when and how hard to work
and guarantee that the agent will only work in the more productive states by not
setting the bonus too high. In a case like this, when the additional information leads
to improved production decisions, it is welfare-enhancing. Most real-world cases will
be a mixture of the two effects, so we can expect to observe both increases in
performance-pay and greater latitude given to the agent in making production
decisions.3 '
3.4 The effect of increasing the number of activities
Although the preceding model demonstrated an increase in performance pay
associated with improvements in the agent's information, the effect is even more
pronounced when the agent must allocate his effort among a number of activities.
Information technology can be used by the agent to identify opportunities for
increased revenues or reduced costs, but if the agent is paid a fixed salary, he will
have no incentive to identify and pursue such new activities. Giving the agent access
to such information will require an increase in the output-based component of his
compensation, not only to help him identify new opportunities that are valuable to
the principal, but just as in the previous case, the information may make
performance pay necessary just to keep the agent from using the information against
the principal's interests.
Consider a situation similar to the previous case where the agent can apply
either high or low effort to an activity, thereby affecting the probability of a
successful outcome for the principal. Solving for the optimal contract will yield a
share of output paid to the agent, s(x), which will generally be less than 100%.
What happens when the agent is able to identify new ways of generating
output, perhaps because of better information or through the introduction of a
flexible manufacturing system? Optimally, the principal would like the agent to
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engage in a second activity only if the benefits of his effort there outweighed the
costs. However, the optimal incentive scheme for one activity is no longer optimal
when the agent has the option of engaging in more than one activity. In particular,
he will use his new information only when the benefits outweigh the costs to him,
personally. Because the agent only gets a share s(x) < 100% of the total benefits of
the new activity, he will ignore it unless the benefits are so large that his share alone
will outweigh the personal costs to him.32 Thus, giving the agent better
information about profitable new activities will not be enough to get the agent to act
on them unless he has sufficient incentives. In general, the old incentives may or
may not be sufficient to also get the agent to work on any given new activity. As the
number of new activities increases, it becomes more likely that some profitable ones
will be passed up unless the agent's output-based pay is increased.
Furthermore, increased incentive pay may not only be required to keep the
agent from forgoing profitable opportunities, but may also be necessary just to
maintain the same output levels as before the agent became informed. In fact, any
compensation scheme that pays the agent less than a 100% share of output is
potentially vulnerable to being undermined when the agent knows about alternative
activities which have private benefits to the agent. The agent may prefer to spend
his time on an activity which he finds personally beneficial at the expense of the
principal's preferred action, since his decisions is based on getting 100% of the
private benefits of his actions, but only a share s(x) of the benefits to the principal.
The agent will shift effort to a new activity with lower total benefits if it provides
greater private benefits, unless the principal raises the his share s(x) sufficiently. As
in section 3.3, informed agents are harder to control.
An alternative to increased performance pay is to forbid the agent from
engaging in any activities that are not pre-authorized by the principal.33 Strict
rules, fixed job duties, tightly limited budgets and other manifestations of
bureaucracy are all examples of limits that a firm can impose on its employees to
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reduce the need for incentive pay. However, these measures negate much of the
benefit from decentralizing the information processing function to the agent.
Furthermore, without extensive monitoring, the principal may not even know exactly
which activities the agent is undertaking. As discussed earlier, information work will
often be harder to monitor than physical work.
3.5 "Performance pay" isn't always what it seems
It should be stressed that there is an important qualification to the result that
performance pay increases as the agent gets better information. This only applies to
true performance pay: pay that is linked to output, the whole output and nothing
but the output. Often what is called "performance pay" is actually pay linked to
indirect performance measures that can only proxy for output.
If the indirect performance measures do not fully reward output in some
states, then any information system that identifies these states to the agent will lead
to shift effort away from them. As a result, the principal may actually have to
reduce her reliance on such indirect "performance-pay" whenever the agent can
distinguish among compensated and uncompensated activities. For instance,
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) show that when the agent has a fixed amount of
attention that he can allocate across different activities, it may be necessary to
decrease incentives on those activities that can be monitored to keep the agent from
reducing effort on the unmonitored activities. Analogous inefficiencies result when
"performance pay" rewards all types of productive effort, but also includes rewards
for unproductive activities or rewards for actions disproportionate to their value to
the principal (Baker, 1990b). Excess effort will be applied to activities that are
relatively unproductive but rewarded nonetheless. For these reasons, the benefits of
indirect types of performance pay can be ambiguous as the agent gets better
information. However, the benefits to providing true output-based compensation
will only be strengthened. 34
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3.6 Summary of the role of incentive pay
In summary, as the agent gets better information, the optimal incentive
contract will tend to increase the share of compensation that is directly linked to
output, while reducing the share that is constant, (e.g. base salary), and, quite
possibly, the share that is function of only indirect measures, (e.g. rewards and
punishments based on behavior). Rewards based on output, while encouraging
more of the right kinds of work, also have drawbacks to the extent that they expose
the agent to more risk. However, as analyzed in this section, one cannot capture
the full benefits of the agent's improved information without also linking his
compensation more closely to output. In fact, improving the agent's information
without changing the incentive scheme may well make the principal worse off.
While I have demonstrated in this section a causal link between
improvements in the agents' information and increases in the optimal amount of
their output-based compensation, this link is strengthened by positive feedback in
the other direction. As Baker (1990a) put it:
The unleashing of middle management creativity which accompanies
the use of pay-for-performance compensation systems can be dramatic.
When companies alter the terms of employment in such a way that,
rather than being told what to do, middle managers are rewarded or
punished based on the outcomes of their decisions, these managers
have new incentives to learn about their jobs and their environment.
Thus, the use of output-based pay will in turn lead to even better information
on the part of agents. This can further reduce the cognitive load on upper
managers. Instead of the near omniscience required to direct specific actions, they
can be more like the "consultants" and "facilitators" described by Kanter, who help
their subordinates by contributing relevant, if not all-encompassing, insights. Instead
of commanding, the manager must "sell" his subordinates on the idea that certain
actions will likely lead to greater output and, not coincidentally, output-based pay.
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Obviously, the shift to output-based compensation systems requires a
significant change in the culture and attitudes at all levels of the firm. But
information, discretion, and incentives each reinforce each other, and it is difficult to
gain the benefits of one without the others.
4. Conclusion
To remain competitive -- maybe even to survive -- businesses will have
to convert themselves into organizations of knowledgeable specialists.
- Drucker, 1988
4.1 Summary
The shift in the 19th century from a largely agricultural to a largely industrial
society was associated with profound changes in the organization of work. The shift
now taking place from a largely industrial society to one in which most effort goes
into, and most value is produced by, information processing activities may lead to
comparable changes in the organizational superstructure.
While the organization of work has begun to change significantly, we are only
beginning to understand the nature of those changes. The same characteristics
emerge in almost every description of the "new managerial work" in its various
incarnations -- decentralization, flexibility, new technologies, incentive pay, reduced
hierarchy -- but there has been much less consensus on the underlying causes and
mechanisms.
In this paper, I present an agent-theoretic analysis of two features that are at
the core of the phenomenon: the decentralization of information and decision-
making, and the increased use of output-based compensation. Working within a
framework of boundedly rational and self-interested agents, it has been shown that
1) the reduces costs of information can lead to a broader distribution of information
work throughout the organization, and 2) as workers become better informed, their
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optimal compensation package will include more output-based pay.
The hierarchical, command-based mode of organization is efficient when each
manager has no less work-related information than her subordinates do. However,
the total amount of potentially useful information about work and the environment
has dramatically increased, largely because of advances in information technolog. 3 5
The resulting flood often exceeds the capacity of any one human brain. If the
information is to be of benefit to the organization, it must be distributed to multiple
agents, along with the decision-making authority to use it. Decision-making agents
cannot be managed by prespecifying their actions -- this would amount to deciding
for them. The alternative is to change their incentives so that it is in their own
interest to maximize the output of the firm. This necessitates the use of output-
based compensation. In turn, the output-based compensation system reinforces the
agents' incentives to gather more information which, assuming a properly designed
incentive systems, 36 can further benefit the firm.
The models present a parsimonious explanation of the causes and
mechanisms of the new organization of work, which can be viewed as either a
supplement or alternative to previous approaches. Taking seriously the evidence of
the organizational field studies also gives insight into the strengths and limitations of
applying conventional principal-agent doctrine: while the incentive pay needed to
motivate agents with private information is costly, the alternative solution of
providing a single principal at the hub of the firm with all the necessary decision-
making information is less feasible in practice than theory has suggested. This
implies that information economics must be extended to include the costs of human
information processing if it is to realistically model complex organizations.
4.2 Managerial Implications
One practical implication of the models presented in this paper is that the
53
new managerial work of decentralization and output-based compensation is not just
a fad destined to go the way of portfolio management. Rather it has a sound
economic basis in the increased proportion of information work, enabled, if not
required, by the growth of information technology and automation. As their
employees become better informed, managers must be prepared to delegate more
decision-making and share the rewards of success. In contrast, the all-to-common
assumption that advanced information systems will enable tighter control by top
management must be tempered by the realization that attention, not information, is
usually the scarce resource in the tops of organizations.
Agency theory has long made apparent the importance of collocating decision
rights with information, but the models presented in this paper suggest that the new
winning organizational strategy is likely to be based on moving decision-rights and
incentives out to the field rather than moving more information to the executive
suite. This philosophy conflicts with "tried and true" management heuristics that
evolved in an earlier environment and may undermine the authority of the
traditional chain of command, but the technological and economic forces driving it
cannot be ignored. Growing complexity and information overload put an increasing
burden on the "visible hand" of management, but at the same time, technology is can
provide new opportunities for alternatives to conscious coordination. By distributing
the processing load and designing self-regulating systems, tasks beyond the
comprehension of any single decision-maker can be successfully undertaken. This
paper shows that strengthening the output-based compensation of employees is a
natural way to align their incentives to make the right decisions on their own.
Instead of directing employees, management can focus on the more manageable
task of providing the right rewards for the outputs it desires. In some cases, when
output measures are sufficiently refined, even this step can be largely automated
with a compensation formula.
The oldest self-regulating system is the market. In fact, management may
54
III
want to consider that the ultimate strategy for the decentralization of decision-rights
and incentives is the reorganization and dis-integration of the firm itself, thereby
providing each division and even each knowledge worker with the full prerogatives
and incentives of independent ownership. Because it unavoidably exposes agents to
more risk, and given difficulties in decomposing work, the applicability of this
strategy may be limited in many industries. Nevertheless, the decline in vertical
integration and average firm size (Brynjolfsson, et al. 1989), and the unprecedented
increase in number of consultants and entrepreneurs in the past decade (Bureau of
Labor Statistics, cited in Wall Street Journal, 1988) may be evidence of its growing
success overall.
There are parallel implications for the design of information systems.
Technical feasibility notwithstanding, a "master database" is not likely to be
successful if its objective is to funnel all the corporate records to the top of the
hierarchy, instead of to line personnel. Systems designed for executives will only
worsen the bottleneck unless they conserve on managerial attention by providing
output that is smaller, and more easily understood than their input. This includes
systems like information "refineries" and filters. The most valuable executive
systems will not merely retrieve information but will solve some problems
autonomously, relieving some (presumably more routine) aspects of the decision-
making load. While improved filters and decision-making systems may slow the shift
to decentralization, more growth is apt to occur in systems aimed at the emerging
needs of the new managerial work. This validates the demand for systems designed
to help coordinate large numbers of informed agents within an organization -- such
as e-mail, "groupware" and other branches of computer-supported cooperative
work -- and systems for coordinating transactions across organizational boundaries,
like interorganizational information systems. To the extent that all these are
increasingly popular research topics, the models presented in this paper provide
some justification apart from their technological merit.
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Much of the advice given managers is based, sometimes implicitly, on
emulating the practices of successful firms in their industry. The link between the
new managerial work and information work derived in this paper suggests other
organizations and professions with a historically high proportion of information
workers that may serve as models for the emerging structures. For instance,
professionals like doctors, lawyers and management consultants, who typically have
superior information to the people they work for, are more likely than other workers
to have significant discretion and to be paid based on output. Even when they are
part of a large organization, like a hospital, they are unlikely to be subject to much
hierarchical control. For instance, in most hospitals a triage nurse makes the
decision of what case each doctor will handle. While this role is nominally parallel
to the management duties in a traditional firm, the perceived hierarchy and
authority is very different. Ultimate decision authority and even monetary incentives
are more closely aligned with the relative knowledge of the agents than with the
nominal flow of work. In light of their common fundamentals regarding the
distribution of knowledge, it is not surprising that several researchers have noted
similarities between the new organization of work and that of the hospital,
consulting firm and investment bank (Drucker, 1988; Eccles, 1988).
The admonitions of management consultants and many academics to imitate
these organizations and to decentralize, delegate and provide more incentive pay are
supported by the models presented in this paper, but they also suggest that the
advice should not be applied wantonly. The new managerial work is best viewed as
a rational organizational response to a specific problem, and not as a newly
discovered panacea for all that ails business. For instance, the use of incentive pay
does not necessarily apply to everyone in the organization but only those whose have
the information and knowledge to be properly given decision-making authority.
Furthermore, effective use of output-based compensation presumes an ability to
measure outputs, which is not always possible. In some cases, when the need for
appropriate incentives is particularly acute, firm value, as measured by its stock
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price, may be taken as the ultimate output. Unfortunately, stock ownership is an
imperfect solution, especially in larger firms, because it subjects the agent to the risk
of factors beyond his control.
The manager must also consider his firm's environment and technology
before implementing the new managerial work. In stable industries, where the
information needed to run the business is minimal, there is little danger of
information overload, so the logic of decentralization and performance pay does not
apply. Companies that concentrate on only one product, on simple products, and/or
on mature markets are more likely to be able to manage their more modest
information processing challenges without distributing decision-making.
Finally, the models presented suggest that the new managerial work is in
large part a consequence of the strengths and weaknesses of recent generations of
information technology: useful information can be generated and distributed far
faster than it can be processed. Management would do well to keep an eye on the
technology, because there is no guarantee that this will always be the case.
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Notes
1. IBM originally estimated the total worldwide market for computers at just 10 units;
with the advent of cheap, miniaturized components and microcomputers, over 10 million
computers are currently sold annually (Halal, 1986). For a contrary view, arguing that
the growing demand for information technology drove subsequent costs declines see
Jonscher, (1983).
2. See Crowston and Malone (1988) an excellent summary of the literature on
information technology and work organization.
3. Williamson (1975) cites the same two human factors as being at the root of transaction
costs. He uses the terms "bounded rationality" and "opportunism". The former limits the
"powers of individual to receive, store, retrieve and process information without error"
and limits individuals' abilities to "articulate their knowledge or feelings by the use of
words, numbers or graphics in ways which permit them to be understood by others". The
latter is the "strategic" manipulation of information or misrepresentation of intentions.
4. The strong assumptions, particularly regarding the principal's computational abilities,
limit the practical applicability of these results. Holmstrom put it more strongly, saying
"the mechanism design approach is not about to deliver an answer to the ultimate
question of what an optimal economic system ought to look like." (Holmstrom, 1985)
5. Throughout this paper, by improvements in the quality of information, I mean
improvements in the Blackwell sense of greater informativeness resulting from a finer
partition of the state-space.
6. He focuses particularly on the LBO partnership.
7. Clippinger and Konsynski call for the development of "information refineries" as a
"counter technology, invented to correct the excesses or imbalances of other [information]
technologies".
8. We can largely ignore information that is "cospecialized", in that it originates and is
used by the same agent.
9. Of course, the organization must still provide incentives for its members to obey these
instructions. This issue is taken up in section three.
10. It will only be optimal for more than one agent to process information if they
happen to have exactly identical costs.
11. One could speculate that those types of information that lend themselves easily to
machine processing because of their concreteness and aggregatibility (e.g. numerical
data) would become relatively more centralized by information technology while those
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that required extensive complementary processing by humans (heuristic or idiosyncratic
pattern recognition) would become more decentralized. Applegate, Cash and Mills
(1989) present some evidence supporting this idea; depending on the dimension
measured the modern firm is becoming both more centralized and decentralized.
12. Actually, recent trends in the price to performance ratios of computers are
increasingly favoring decentralized processing as well. Already, personal computers
deliver over 50 times more power, as measured in millions of instructions per second
(MIPS) as mainframes (Ferguson, 1990) and small end-user computers are generally
predicted to gain an increasing cost advantage over centralized computing (Gurbaxani &
Kemerer, 1989). The inability to proportionately scale up the information processing
capacity of machines is creating an analogous incentive for decentralizing processing as
that discussed in the text with regard to human information processing, and a few
researchers are exploring analogous solutions (Huberman, 1988).
13. Simon (1976) has estimated that "we can handle only 50 [bits per second]", and that
our short-term memory can store "seven plus or minus two items" (Newell and Simon,
1972). Whatever, the true numbers, human processing capacity is bounded and not easily
augmentable.
14. An upper limit on the agency costs is the risk premium that would have to be paid to
the agent for him to agree to become the residual claimant on the effects of his actions.
15. For example, decision support systems (Keen and Scott Morton, 1978), knowledge-
based expert systems (Hayes-Roth et al., 1983), intelligent information filters (Lai et al.,
1989), and information "refineries" (Clippinger and Konsynski, 1989) all seek to relieve
aspects of the information processing burden.
16. Malone's (1988) discussion of the "first-order" and "second-order" effects of lower
information processing costs is apposite.
17. Van Zandt shows that the lack of an effective price mechanism for "attention" can
lead to a loss of welfare for both senders and receivers of information as the cost of
communication channels declines. He also provides a brief literature review on attempts
to deal with the problem.
18. Agency theory dictates that events which are completely beyond the control of the
agent should not enter into the performance contract, unless the agent can affect the
consequences of these events on output (Holmstrom, 1979). Baker (1990a) discusses the
empirical use of controllable performance measures.
19. The other main branch of the asymmetric information literature is generally called
"adverse selection" and studies the affects of differential information before contracts are
agreed to.
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20. The term "state of nature" is used to refer to any aspect of the environment that
could affect the job: customers, prices, suppliers, weather, etc.
21. In my discussion of principal-agent contracts, I will consistently be using the feminine
pronouns to refer to the principal and the masculine pronouns for the agent.
22. Ex ante, the optimal effort level can be calculated from the first order condition
which equates the marginal costs of effort with the expected marginal benefit of effort,
where the expectation is taken over the prior probability of all possible states. Under the
typical assumptions of increasing marginal costs of effort and diminishing marginal
returns to effort, the second order conditions will be met, although more generally the
effort level yielded by this program may not be unique or even globally optimal, unless
one puts further restriction on the costs and output functions.
23. More generally, if the principal is not risk-neutral, the optimal contract will still
provide for perfect risk-sharing but will provide some insurance for the principal as well.
In particular, the ratio of the marginal utility of income to each party will be constant.
Formally, in the case where the value of output is x, the share to the agent is s(x), the
principal's utility is given by V(x - s(x)) and the agent's utility is separable in his income
and his cost of effort, u(s(x) - c(e)), we have:
V'(x- s(x))/u'(s(x) = k,
where k is a constant determined by how the rents are to be divided between the parties.
24. See Harris and Raviv (1979) for a formal derivation of this result.
25. See for instance Sappington (1983) and Hart and Holmstrom (1987). Obviously,
bonuses and/or penalties will lead to suboptimal risk-sharing when the agent is risk-averse
and the principal is not. The agent also bears more than the first-best amount of risk
when both parties are risk-averse. In contrast to the optimal contract under symmetric
information (see note 21 above), the ratio of their marginal utilities will be equal to a
constant (as in the first best) plus an additional term that is a function of the observed
outcome:
V'(x- s(x))/u'(s(x) = k + m(x)
26. Myerson (1982) was the first to use the descriptive term "revelation principle", but the
technique had been used at least as early as 1973 by Gibbard. Dasgupta, Hammond and
Maskin (1979) provide a detailed analysis of the principle.
27. Namely that the space of optimal actions for the agent is at least as fine-grained as
the information upon which the actions are based.
28. Baker (1990a) analyzes in depth how making an agents pay contingent on
performance measures other than actual output can lead the agent to "game" the
performance measure when he has some private information.
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29. In some circumstances, meeting the additional constraints will prove so expensive to
the principal that she is better off ignoring them, allowing the agent to take sub-optimal
actions.
30. In the absence of a public randomizing device to convexity the payoffs, the revelation
principle does not apply. However, introducing convex payoffs and applying the principle
would not qualitatively change the results anyway.
31. It is usually, but not always, advantageous to give the agent greater discretion as his
information improves. Holmstrom (1984) shows that in a quantity-control model drawn
from Weitzman (1974) the agent will have fewer restrictions on the quantity of a good he
provides but found that his results could not be directly generalized.
32. Recall that because the agent's effort is unobservable to the principal, she cannot
compensate him for directly for his effort.
33. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) discuss extensively how curtailing the agents options
can reduce the need for incentive pay.
34. Changes in the value of the firm are the ultimate measures of the contribution of an
agent. When no other good performance measures exist or contracts are otherwise
incomplete, giving the agent partial, or even complete, ownership of the firm may be
necessary. This topic is explored further in Brynjolfsson (1990).
35. A natural extension of this paper would be to consider other factors that have
increased the amount of information work done like education, training and experience,
and determine whether these have had similar effects on the organization of work.
36. Of course, to the extent that many incentive systems do not fully align the agent's
goals with those of the firm, they will lead the agent to gather too much of the wrong
kinds of information.
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